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INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, the very purpose of affording copyright holders 
exclusive rights is to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”1  
The European Union justifies copyright protection as something that “helps 
to ensure the maintenance and development of creativity in the interests of 
authors, performers, producers, consumers, culture, industry and the public 
at large.”2  Secondary markets, or markets for used goods, promote these 
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 1.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 2.  Council Directive 2001/29, recital 9, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 11 (EC). 
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very similar purposes by providing additional opportunities for consumers 
to obtain copyrighted works, often below the market price for a new 
version of the work.3  Currently, secondary markets for digital goods do not 
exist in the United States, and although the European Union allows 
software to be sold in the secondary market, it has not extended this 
opportunity to any other digital goods.  Consequently, American and 
European consumers have been foreclosed from buying and selling used 
digital music and electronic books. 
Technological advancements have created access to digital formats of 
copyrighted works, which has increased consumer demand for access to 
secondary markets for digital goods.  For example, music sales reached a 
new peak in 2000, when Americans purchased 943 million CD albums,4 
but with the advent of iTunes in 2003, profits from digital sales 
outnumbered profits from CD sales by 2011.5  Over the past eight years, 
consumers have shown their preference for digital music, due to its easy 
accessibility on various devices, over physical CDs or records.6  The 
electronic book market has had similar popularity and currently comprises 
roughly 20% of the book sales market.7  The need for secondary markets 
has become apparent, however.  For instance, in 2013, sales for electronic 
books only grew 5%, in part due to consumers’ inability to give away or 
resell electronic books.8 
There are two major reasons that secondary markets for digital goods 
do not exist: (1) the failure of courts in the United States and the European 
Union to extend the first sale doctrine9 (called “exhaustion” in the EU) to 
 
 3.  Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 4.  Adrian Covert, A Decade of iTunes Singles Killed the Music Industry, CNN MONEY (Apr. 25, 
2013, 6:09 PM ET), http://money.cnn.com/2013/04/25/technology/itunes-music-decline/. 
 5.  Laurie Segall, Digital Music Sales Top Physical Sales, CNN MONEY (Jan. 5, 2012, 5:47 PM 
ET), http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/05/technology/digital_music_sales/ (“According to a Nielsen and 
Billboard report, digital music purchases accounted for 50.3% of music sales in 2011.  Digital sales 
were up 8.4% from the previous year, while physical album sales declined 5%.”). 
 6.  See id. 
 7.  Andi Sporkin, Bookstats 2013 Now Available, ASS’N OF AM. PUBLISHERS (May 15, 2013), 
http://publishers.org/press/103/ (citing statistics from BookStats, a co-production of the American 
Association of Publishers and the Book Industry Study Group, which “captures net revenue and units 
for all key publishing categories, sectors, formats and main genres”). 
 8.  Eliana Dockterman, The Pen is Mightier: E-book Growth Stagnating, TIME (Oct. 31, 2013), 
http://business.time.com/2013/10/31/the-pen-is-mightier-e-book-growth-stagnating/ (citing a report 
from the Book Industry Study Group); Readers Want More Value for Ebooks, New Study Suggests, 
DIGITAL BOOK WORLD (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.digitalbookworld.com/2013/readers-want-more-
value-for-ebooks-new-study-suggests/. 
 9.  Copyright Act of 1976 § 109(a), 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012) (explaining that the first sale 
doctrine states that a copyright owner’s exclusive distribution rights are exhausted after the owner’s 
first sale of a particular copy of the copyrighted work). 
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digital goods and (2) the restraints that licensing agreements place on the 
ability to transfer or resell digital goods.  Because there is no explicit first 
sale doctrine in the digital domain, courts have largely been left to navigate 
on their own its applicability to the ever-expanding digital world.  
Recently, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York decided that music downloaded from iTunes could not be resold in a 
secondary market because the copyright owner’s reproduction right had 
been violated.10 
Additionally, most, if not all, digital goods are acquired pursuant to a 
licensing agreement.11  Licensing agreements prohibit licensees from 
redistributing, transmitting, assigning, selling, broadcasting, renting, 
sharing, lending, modifying, adapting, editing, licensing, or otherwise 
transferring the digital good,12 which effectively forecloses the use of the 
first sale doctrine as a defense in suits for copyright infringement.  The use 
of restrictive licensing agreements in connection with obtaining digital 
goods should be viewed skeptically because the first sale doctrine’s 
application to digital goods has significant implications for the creation and 
existence of high-demand secondary markets.13 
The European Union has taken steps towards making digital goods 
available in secondary markets.  The European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
determined that exhaustion applies to software, which opened the door for 
consumers to obtain software in the secondary market.14  The decision’s 
application to other digital goods, however, is uncertain.  Recently, a 
German court determined that exhaustion does not apply to electronic 
 
 10.  Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655–56 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 11.  Digital goods are accessible on the Internet through downloading services such as iTunes and 
streaming services such as Spotify and YouTube.  All of these services allow users to access music by 
agreeing to a licensing agreement.  See, e.g., Licensed Application End User License Agreement, 
APPLE, http://www.apple.com/legal/internet-services/itunes/appstore/dev/stdeula/ (last visited Feb. 28, 
2014); Spotify Terms and Conditions of Use, SPOTIFY (Mar. 5, 2014), https://www.spotify.com/us/legal/ 
end-user-agreement/. 
 12.  See, e.g., Licensed Application End User License Agreement, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/ 
legal/internet-services/itunes/appstore/dev/stdeula/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2014); Spotify Terms and 
Conditions of Use, SPOTIFY (Mar. 5, 2014), https://www.spotify.com/us/legal/end-user-agreement/. 
 13.  As applied to digital music, the first sale doctrine may be a moot issue.   
See Ben Sisario, As Music Streaming Grows, Royalties Slow to a Trickle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/business/media/streaming-shakes-up-music-industrys-model-for-
royalties.html?_r=0 (“[T]he music industry is undergoing another, even more radical, digital 
transformation as listeners begin to move from CDs and downloads to streaming services like Spotify, 
Pandora and YouTube.”).  If consumers are content with having free access to music rather than paying 
to download music, the demand for a secondary market in digital music may have ceased to exist. 
 14.  Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp. (July 3, 2012), available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/. 
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books.15  The incongruence between the application of exhaustion to 
software but not to other copyrighted works has set the stage for the ECJ to 
determine whether to expand the rule of exhaustion to all digital goods in 
the European Union. 
If secondary markets for digital goods are to exist, it is imperative that 
either the judicial or legislative system in the United States and abroad 
determine the applicability of the first sale doctrine to digital goods and 
place limits on the scope of restrictive licensing schemes.  Part I discusses a 
recent decision from the Southern District of New York about digital 
secondary markets.  Part II discusses the first sale doctrine and its current 
application to digital goods.  Part III discusses the structure and reasoning 
of the pervasive use of licensing schemes in the digital era.  Part IV 
discusses the intersection of the first sale doctrine and licensing schemes 
and the implications for digital secondary markets.  Part V discusses the 
European Union’s approach to licenses and exhaustion as applied to digital 
goods.  Lastly, Part VI offers potential judicial and legislative solutions so 
that secondary markets for digital goods can become a reality. 
I. CAPITOL RECORDS, LLC V. REDIGI, INC. 
In Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., the Southern District of New 
York addressed the issue of whether ReDigi could permissibly enable its 
users to buy and sell “used” digital copies of songs.16  ReDigi was a 
marketplace for digital goods where users could buy and sell “used” music 
files at a lower price than offered on digital music marketplaces such as 
iTunes and Amazon.17  It only allowed “legally owned, lawfully purchased 
digital works” to be purchased and sold in its marketplace and “reject[ed] 
pirated or unauthorized versions.”18 
Initially, to access ReDigi’s service, a user was required to download 
the “Media Manager,” which identified a digital work’s source and 
confirmed its eligibility for resale.19  To be eligible for sale, a file had to 
have been purchased from iTunes or another ReDigi user; files downloaded 
from CDs or other websites were not eligible for sale.20  Once verified, the 
 
 15.  Emma Linklater, E-books Distinguished from Software, Not Exhausted, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 
& PRAC. 685, 686 (2013) (discussing Case 4 O 191/11, Landgericht Bielefeld [LG][Bielefeld Regional 
Court] Mar. 5, 2013). 
 16.  934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 645–46 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 17.  Id. at 645. 
 18.  Theodore Serra, Rebalancing at Resale: ReDigi, Royalties, and the Digital Secondary 
Market, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1753, 1757 (2013). 
 19.  ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 645. 
 20.  Id. 
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file was then transferred to ReDigi’s cloud-based system, and any 
duplicates were removed from the seller’s computer and synced devices.21  
The seller would have access to any song designated for sale until it was 
purchased, at which time access to the song would cease.22  The court 
determined that ReDigi had infringed Capitol Records’s copyright because 
the transfer from the seller’s computer to the cloud service had created a 
copy of the file, which had violated the copyright owner’s reproduction 
right.23  Because the copy on the cloud service had not been “lawfully 
made,” ReDigi’s first sale defense failed.24 
Given the variation in courts’ application of copyright law to digital 
goods, another court might easily have determined that the transfer of the 
digital file to the cloud service was lawful under the fair use doctrine 
because it fulfilled copyright’s basic purpose.25  Additionally, future 
technology may not require transferring a copy of the file to a cloud service 
and would therefore not violate the reproduction rights of the copyright 
owner.  Assuming the reproduction right has not been violated, another 
major hurdle arises for ReDigi: can a download from iTunes or Amazon be 
lawfully resold since it was obtained pursuant to a licensing agreement?  
Effectively answering this question requires looking to the history of the 
first sale doctrine and the use of licenses in an age where digital goods 
abound. 
II. HISTORY OF THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE 
The Copyright Act confers upon copyright owners the exclusive rights 
 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 646. 
 23.  Id. at 650–51. 
 24.  Id. at 655–56. 
 25.  See id. at 652–53 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g 
Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 1998)) (“‘The ultimate test of fair use . . . is whether the copyright 
law’s goal of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts” would be better served by allowing 
the use than by preventing it.’  Accordingly, fair use permits reproduction of copyrighted work without 
the copyright owner’s consent ‘for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research.’” (citations omitted)).  Judge 
Chin, in the Southern District of New York, just granted Google, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment 
based on a fair use defense in that company’s eight-year litigation against the Authors Guild over the 
service “Google Books.”  See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013).  Google made a perfect reproduction of every book contained in a number of libraries across the 
country in order to digitally display snippets of the books in its online database, Google Books.  Id. at 
286.  The court determined that this practice was acceptable under the fair use defense, which “permits 
the fair use of copyrighted works ‘to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts.”‘“  Id. at 289–90 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 
575 (1994)). 
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to reproduce and distribute their work.26  In 1908, the Supreme Court of the 
United States, in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, limited the copyright 
owner’s exclusive right to distribute by recognizing the first sale doctrine.27  
At issue in Bobbs-Merrill was whether a copyright owner could restrict the 
resale terms of its copyrighted material.28  The Court interpreted the 
copyright statute’s “sole right to vend” language to prohibit a publisher 
from restricting future sales of a book by placing a notice on the cover that 
limits resale to a price of one dollar or more.29  Specifically, the court found 
that copyright holders may not “fasten, by notice . . . a restriction upon the 
subsequent alienation of the subject-matter of copyright after the owner had 
parted with the title to one who had acquired full dominion over it and had 
given a satisfactory price for it.”30  One year later, Congress codified the 
first sale doctrine in section 41 of the 1909 Copyright Act.31 
The first sale doctrine is an affirmative defense that exhausts a 
copyright owner’s exclusive distribution right after the owner’s first sale of 
a particular copy of the copyrighted work.32  The doctrine is invoked if the 
defendant has full ownership of the copy of the work in question and that 
copy was obtained legally.33  Therefore, “[i]llegal copies of copyrighted 
works do not receive the benefit of the first sale doctrine,” even if the 
illegal copy was obtained through seemingly lawful means.34 
In 1996, the Registrar of the Copyright Office stated that “[t]he first 
sale doctrine was developed to avoid restraints on the alienation of physical 
property, and to prevent publishers from controlling not only initial sales of 
books, but the after-market for resales.”35  Ultimately, the main question 
under the first sale doctrine can be characterized as “whether or not there 
 
 26.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (explaining that “the owner of copyright under this title has the 
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in 
copies or phonorecords; . . . (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.”). 
 27.  210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
 28.  Id. at 343. 
 29.  Id. at 349–51. 
 30.  Id. at 349–50. 
 31.  Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 27 (1976)), 
repealed by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in 17 
U.S.C.) (resolving that “nothing in this title shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of 
any copy of a copyrighted work the possession of which has been lawfully obtained”). 
 32.  Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 33.  Rachel Ann Geist, A “License to Read”: The Effect of E-books on Publishers, Libraries, and 
the First Sale Doctrine, 52 IDEA: INTELL. PROP. REV. 63, 69–70 (2012). 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Marybeth Peters, The Spring 1996 Horace S. Manges Lecture – The National Information 
Infrastructure: A Copyright Office Perspective, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 341, 356 (1996). 
COBB MACRO(DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2014  8:58 PM 
2014] LICENSING AGREEMENTS AND THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE 535 
has been such a disposition of the copyrighted article that it may fairly be 
said that the copyright proprietor has received his reward for its use.”36  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has determined that there is no 
geographical boundary to the first sale doctrine: it applies to copies of 
copyrighted works manufactured abroad.37  Therefore, copyright owners 
cannot prevent a copyrighted work, lawfully manufactured and sold abroad, 
from being imported and resold in the United States.38 
In 2001, however, the United States Copyright Office rejected the 
extension of the first sale doctrine to digital works.39  It stated that 
“[b]ecause the underlying purpose of the first sale doctrine is to ensure the 
free circulation of tangible copies, it simply cannot be said that a 
transformation of section 109 to cover digital transmissions furthers that 
purpose.”40 
Furthermore, it noted that the first sale doctrine is “limited in the off-
line world by a number of factors, including geography and the gradual 
degradation of books and analog works” and that “[t]he absence of such 
limitations would have an adverse effect on the market for digital works.”41  
Specifically, the Office noted that such limitations do not distinguish digital 
secondary markets in the way that they distinguish physical markets: 
 
Physical copies of works degrade with time and use, making used copies 
less desirable than new ones.  Digital information does not degrade, and 
can be reproduced perfectly on a recipient’s computer.  The “used” copy 
is just as desirable as (in fact, is indistinguishable from) a new copy of 
the same work.  Time, space, effort and cost no longer act as barriers to 
the movement of copies, since digital copies can be transmitted nearly 
instantaneously anywhere in the world with minimal effort and 
negligible cost.  The need to transport physical copies of works, which 
acts as a natural brake on the effect of resales on the copyright owner’s 
market, no longer exists in the realm of digital transmissions.  The ability 
 
 36.  Burke & Van Heusen, Inc. v. Arrow Drug, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 881, 884 (E.D. Pa. 1964). 
 37.  Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1355–56 (2013). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 87–88 (2001). 
 40.  Id.  There are several differences between consumer sales law and copyright law.  Consumer 
sales law originates from an idea of ownership that allows the buyer of any good to use that good as the 
buyer sees fit.  N. Helberger et al., Digital Content Contracts for Consumers, 36 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 
37, 46 (2013).  Conversely, “the basic tenet of copyright law is that ownership of a physical copy of a 
work does not grant any ownership in the copyright on the work embodied in the physical object”; 
rather, the purchaser owns the physical copy of the work but is simply a licensee of the copyright 
contained in the physical good.  Id.  Since digital goods are not embodied in a physical copy, a 
straightforward application of consumer sales law to digital goods becomes difficult in light of 
copyright law.  Id. 
 41.  U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 39, at xi. 
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of such “used” copies to compete for market share with new copies is 
thus far greater in the digital world.42 
 
The Copyright Office was also concerned with the use of effective 
“forward-and-delete” technology.43  A person who sells a tangible item no 
longer has access to that item.  In the digital age, however, unless the 
seller’s copy is deleted upon resale, the seller can retain a copy of the work.  
The Copyright Office did not trust that consumers would delete their copies 
upon resale and, furthermore, that effective technology that would 
automatically delete the seller’s copy existed.44 
In justifying its position on the first sale doctrine, the Copyright Office 
stated that “[t]he tangible nature of the copy is not a mere relic of a bygone 
technology.”45  Eighteen years later, however, physical copies of music and 
books may be a mere relic since accessing works via digital technology is 
standard practice.  Additionally, the Copyright Office found persuasive that 
the international community had not yet extended the first sale doctrine to 
digital goods.46  Ultimately, due to “potential harm to the market and 
increased risk of infringement,” the Copyright Office determined that the 
first sale doctrine, as applied to digital goods, “could substantially reduce 
the incentive to create.”47  Regardless of the Copyright Office’s stance on 
the application of the first sale doctrine to digital goods, most, if not all, 
digital goods are obtained pursuant to a licensing agreement, which, as 
detailed below, may currently prevent such application. 
III. LICENSING IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
Many providers offer digitally transmitted works to consumers 
pursuant to license agreements.48  A buyer who purchases a digital song 
from iTunes, for example, agrees to a license that prohibits not only resale 
but also any subsequent transfer of the digital file.49 
There are a number of reasons that companies offer digital goods to 
consumers pursuant to a license agreement.  First, a license agreement 
“allows for tiered pricing . . . such as reduced pricing for students or 
 
 42.  Id. at 82–83 (footnote omitted). 
 43.  Id. at 83. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 86. 
 46.  Id. at 94–95. 
 47.  Id. at 88. 
 48.  See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 49.  See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
COBB MACRO(DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2014  8:58 PM 
2014] LICENSING AGREEMENTS AND THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE 537 
educational institutions.”50  Specifically, licensing allows software 
companies to charge according to the features required by the consumer: 
software containing “highly technical features that businesses would need” 
costs more than software encompassing “basic features that students would 
need.”51  Furthermore, some companies charge more based on the length of 
access required, allowing users to choose between long-term and short-
term licenses.52  For tiered pricing to be economically feasible, the products 
must be licensed rather than sold, which “avoids the first sale doctrine and 
so precludes an aftermarket for software that ultimately would result in 
higher retail prices for consumers.”53  This argument, however, is less 
applicable to digital goods, as consumers license songs and books without 
any additional technical features or restrictions on the length of access. 
Second, licenses reduce the number of incidents of piracy by limiting 
the ability of digital goods to be resold or transferred.54  The district court 
in Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. found this argument “unconvincing,” however, 
because “[p]iracy depends on the number of people willing to engage in 
piracy, and a pirate is presumably just as happy to unlawfully duplicate 
software purchased directly from [the corporation] as he is to copy software 
purchased from a reseller.”55  In other words, a person who is motivated to 
pirate digital goods will do so regardless of whether those goods are sold in 
a secondary market. 
Third, and most relevant to this discussion, licenses enable 
“distributors to give customers many more options for accessing and using 
digital content.”56  Specifically, consumers can download songs, films, and 
eBooks to multiple devices, which enables them to “access that song, film, 
or eBook from virtually anywhere at anytime, which would not be the case 
if the customer had purchased a CD, DVD, or paperback book.”57  Access 
options are particularly relevant to the business models of services like 
Netflix, Spotify, and Pandora.  Netflix offers consumers access to an entire 
 
 50.  Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 51.  Gary Donatello, Killing the Secondary Market: How the Ninth Circuit Interpreted Vernor and 
Aftermath to Destroy the First Sale Doctrine, 22 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 59, 85 (2012). 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Justin Graham, Preserving the Aftermarket in Copyrighted Works: Adapting the First Sale 
Doctrine to the Emerging Technological Landscape, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, ¶ 22 (2002). 
 54.  Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1115. 
 55.  Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., No. C07-1189RAJ, 2009 WL 3187613, at *14 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 
30, 2009), vacated, 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 56.  Brief of Amicus Curiae the Copyright Alliance in Support of Affirmance at 18, Adobe Sys. 
Inc., v. Kornrumpf, No. 12-16616 (9th Cir. July 5, 2013) [hereinafter Brief of the Copyright Alliance]. 
 57.  Id. at 20–21. 
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library of movies and television shows for a monthly fee.58  Spotify offers a 
number of different licenses to access digital music from which consumers 
can choose, including a free option that allows consumers to stream an 
unlimited amount of music that is occasionally interrupted by 
advertisements and paid options that do not include advertisements.59  
Licensing also allows consumers to “secure a license for the particular 
song, television episode, or chapter they want, rather than having to buy the 
whole record album, the entire season of the television show, or the entire 
book.”60 
Opponents of licensing schemes believe, however, that 
 
the model for online publishing is shifting from a property-based system 
of transactions governed by copyright law to a contract-based system of 
transactions governed by whatever terms the market will bear, even if 
such terms do not further the pro-dissemination values inherent in the 
Copyright Clause and in copyright law.61 
 
In particular, licenses “do[] not vindicate the law’s aversion to restraints on 
alienation of personal property,” and they “ignore[] the economic realities 
of the relevant transactions, in which the copyright owner permanently 
released software copies into the stream of commerce without expectation 
of return in exchange for upfront payment of the full software price.”62 
Most importantly, expansive licensing schemes have the potential to 
destroy secondary markets.63  Secondary markets “contribute[] to the public 
good by (1) giving consumers additional opportunities to purchase and sell 
copyrighted works, often at below-retail prices; (2) allowing consumers to 
obtain copies of works after a copyright owner has ceased distribution; and 
(3) allowing the proliferation of businesses.”64  Therefore, it is important 
that restrictive licensing schemes be limited so that secondary markets are 
available for digital goods. 
 
 58.  Netflix Terms of Use, NETFLIX, https://signup.netflix.com/TermsOfUse (last updated Sept. 11, 
2013). 
 59.  Brief of the Copyright Alliance, supra note 56. 
 60.  Id. at 21. 
 61.  Kathleen K. Olson, Preserving the Copyright Balance: Statutory and Constitutional 
Preemption of Contract-Based Claims, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 83, 88 (2006). 
 62.  Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 63.  See Donatello, supra note 51, at 81 (“One of the main arguments in favor of a restrictive 
interpretation of license agreements is the fear of the destruction of the secondary market.  Copyright 
holders in all industries may wish to destroy the secondary markets for their works.  This would force 
all consumers to purchase directly from the copyright holder, allowing them to reap all of the profits.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 64.  Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1115. 
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IV. INTERSECTION OF THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE AND 
LICENSES IN THE UNITED STATES 
This leads to two important and related questions regarding the 
application of the first sale doctrine to digital goods: (1) is the application 
of the first sale doctrine to digital goods moot; and (2) if not, does it apply 
to digital goods obtained pursuant to a license? 
With respect to the first question, the first sale doctrine as applied to 
digital music may be moot.  Apple is on track to have its first yearly 
decline in digital music downloads since it launched iTunes in 2003.65  
According to the tracking service Nielsen SoundScan,66 as of October 
2013, music downloads were down 4% from the same time the previous 
year.67  Many music analysts and executives attribute this decline to 
streaming services such as Spotify and Pandora.68  Further proof of the 
increasing preference for streaming services was the September 2013 
unveiling of iTunes Radio, Apple’s response to streaming services like 
Spotify and Pandora.69 
While the ability of services such as Spotify to eventually lead 
consumers to purchase music remains to be seen, at this juncture, 
consumers seem content with the ability to immediately access songs rather 
than having permanent access to digital files stored on their computer.70  
Why would consumers pay to download songs (and receive only a limited 
license, not ownership) when they can access those same songs for a 
nominal fee through streaming services?  Given that consumers do not own 
(and perhaps do not care to own) the music that they are accessing through 
streaming services, there is no demand for a secondary market in digital 
music.  Without demand, the question of the first sale doctrine’s 
applicability to digital music does not even arise.  Furthermore, the policy 
reasons behind secondary markets do not apply when consumers have the 
 
 65.  Ben Sisario, As Downloads Dip, Music Executives Cast a Wary Eye on Streaming Services, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/21/business/media/as-downloads-dip-
music-executives-cast-a-wary-eye-on-streaming-services.html. 
 66.  Audience Measurement, NIELSEN, http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/nielsen-solutions/audience-
measurement.html (last visited June 2, 2014) (“Our audience measurement data and advanced solutions 
provide a comprehensive picture of how, when and where your consumers are connecting with content.  
With this insight, you can create programming that viewers love, which will make you a hit with 
advertisers.”). 
 67.  Sisario, supra note 65. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  iTunes Radio, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/itunes/itunes-radio/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2013). 
 70.  Alan McGlade, Steve Jobs was Wrong – Consumers Want to Rent Their Music, Not Own It 
(Mar. 25, 2013, 1:40 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/alanmcglade/2013/03/25/steve-jobs-was-wrong-
consumers-want-to-rent-their-music-not-own-it/. 
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ability to freely access any music they want via Spotify, Pandora, and 
Youtube.71  Even assuming that a consumer wants to download music 
rather than simply have access to streaming music, it is uncertain whether 
the twenty cents saved by purchasing a “used” song on ReDigi rather than a 
“new” song on iTunes is enough to create demand in the secondary market 
for digital music. 
Although the demand for secondary markets for digital music may 
have evaporated since the creation of streaming music, it is still reasonable 
to believe that secondary markets for other digital goods will continue to be 
in high demand.  Given the decline in sales growth of electronic books, 
some commentators believe that 
 
[w]e may be discovering that e-books are well suited to some types of 
books (like genre fiction) but not well suited to other types (like 
nonfiction and literary fiction) and are well suited to certain reading 
situations (plane trips) but less well suited to others (lying on the couch 
at home).  The e-book may turn out to be more a complement to the 
printed book, as audiobooks have long been, rather than an outright 
substitute.72 
 
Furthermore, while other countries have launched “streaming” 
electronic book services, such services are currently limited in the United 
States, and the prominent option for obtaining electronic books is through 
“ownership”: downloading the book, pursuant to a license, from a 
provider.73  Given the recent trend in streaming music, it may be only a 
matter of time before streaming electronic book services are available in 
 
 71.  Specifically, a secondary market is not needed if consumers are not purchasing or licensing 
the music in the first place but are instead listening to it for free on services like YouTube. 
 72.  Nicholas Carr, Will Gutenberg Laugh Last, ROUGH TYPE (Jan. 1, 2013, 4:50 PM), http:// 
www.roughtype.com/?p=2296. 
 73.  See Emma Hutchings, 24Symbols Aims to Become the “Spotify for E-books,” PSFK (Apr. 11, 
2011), http://www.psfk.com/2011/04/24symbols-aims-to-become-the-spotify-for-e-books.html 
(“24symbols is a Spanish startup currently in beta ahead of its launch in June [2011].  Adopting a 
‘freemium’ model, the service will offer readers different alternatives, such as streaming books for free 
with ads, and paying a subscription for advanced options like offline reading and an extended catalogue 
to choose from.”); Jeremy Greenfield, Why Netflix or Spotify for Ebooks Will Work, FORBES (Oct. 29, 
2013, 4:49 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeremygreenfield/2013/10/29/why-netflix-or-spotify-for-
ebooks-will-work/ (quoting James McQuivey, an analyst of the book publishing industry)_(“All the 
evidence suggests that consumers love subscription content models – it’s the original model of 
magazines and newspapers and cable, and now it’s the power behind Netflix.  I believe it would work 
with books, but like the ebook model in the early days, it won’t work until the publishers are ready to 
embrace it.”).  These are subscription-based models, however, and services like YouTube or 
advertisement-based free access may never exist in the electronic book arena.  Therefore, the secondary 
market for e-books is still in demand by users. 
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the United States.  Providers of electronic books recognize the immediate 
viability of the secondary market, as Amazon has recently patented 
technology to create one.74  The impact that streaming services will have on 
the electronic book market remains to be seen; the applicability of a digital 
first sale doctrine to electronic books, however, is immediately relevant. 
With respect to the second question, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., determined that 
the first sale doctrine only applies to legal owners of a copyrighted good 
and does not extend to licensees of a copy.75  Autodesk, a software 
manufacturer, sold a software program to consumers pursuant to a software 
license agreement, to which consumers had to agree prior to installing the 
software.76  Specifically, the license “recite[d] that Autodesk retains title to 
all copies . . . that the customer has a nonexclusive and nontransferable 
license to use . . . [and] impose[d] transfer restrictions, prohibiting 
customers from renting, leasing, or transferring the software without 
Autodesk’s prior consent.”77  Vernor purchased copies of Autodesk’s 
software and subsequently posted them for sale on eBay.78  Pursuant to the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Autodesk issued a takedown notice to 
eBay, claiming that Vernor’s sales infringed its copyright, and eBay 
terminated Vernor’s auction.79  Vernor brought a declaratory action against 
Autodesk, stating that his sales of the software were protected by the first 
sale doctrine.80  The court looked to three factors to determine if a software 
user is a licensee rather than an owner: (1) “whether the copyright owner 
specifie[d] that a user [wa]s granted a license,” (2) “whether the copyright 
owner significantly restrict[ed] the user’s ability to transfer the software,” 
and (3) “whether the copyright owner impose[d] notable use restrictions.”81  
In determining that Vernor was a licensee, the court stated that he was not 
entitled to invoke the first sale doctrine because he had not received title to 
the copies and “accordingly could not pass ownership on to others.”82 
To clarify the Vernor decision, the Ninth Circuit, in MDY Industries, 
LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., determined the circumstances in 
 
 74.  Amazon Poised to Sell Used E-books, PUBLISHERS WKLY. (Feb. 7, 2013), 
http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/bookselling/article/55849-amazon-
poised-to-sell-used-e-books.html. 
 75.  Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 76.  Id. at 1104. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. at 1105. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. at 1106. 
 81.  Id. at 1110–11. 
 82.  Id. at 1112. 
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which a violation of a license agreement amounts to copyright infringement 
and when it is simply a breach of contract.83  The difference between 
breach of contract and copyright infringement is substantial: a copyright 
infringer may be subject to statutory damages of up to $150,000 for each 
infringement.84  The court noted that if the terms of the license amount to a 
condition, then a breach of that condition constitutes copyright 
infringement.85  If the terms of the license amount to a covenant, then a 
breach of that covenant is actionable only under contract law.86  The two 
are distinguishable because “[a] covenant is a contractual promise,” while a 
“condition precedent is an act or event that must occur before a duty to 
perform a promise arises.”87  Therefore, a copyright owner who grants a 
nonexclusive, limited license generally may not sue their licensees for 
copyright infringement but may instead only recover under a breach of 
contract theory.88  But, if the licensee acts outside the scope of the license 
agreement, then the copyright owner may sue the licensee for copyright 
infringement.89  This is significant because individuals who sell or transfer 
digital goods that they obtained pursuant to a licensing agreement are 
generally acting outside of the scope of the agreement and will be liable for 
copyright infringement, not simply breach of contract.90 
The Ninth Circuit, in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, placed some 
restrictions on the ability of copyright owners to control transfers of their 
goods through the use of licenses.91  Perhaps realizing the significant 
implications of the rights granted to an “owner” as opposed to a “licensee,” 
the court ruled that compact discs distributed to music critics and DJs for 
promotional purposes only are owned by the recipient and may be resold or 
otherwise transferred without the copyright owner’s consent pursuant to the 
first sale doctrine of the Copyright Act and the Unordered Merchandise 
Statute.92  The court noted that simply calling a transaction “a license rather 
than a sale, although it [is] a factor to be considered, [is] not by itself 
 
 83.  629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 84.  17 U.S.C. § 504 (2012). 
 85.  629 F.3d at 939 (citing Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. (Sun I), 188 F.3d 1115, 
1120 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 86.  Id. (citing Sun I, 188 F.3d at 1120). 
 87.  Id. (citing TravelCenters of Am. LLC v. Brog, No. 3751-CC, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 183, at *9 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 5, 2008); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 (1981)). 
 88.  Id. (quoting Sun I, 188 F.3d at 1121). 
 89.  Id. (citing Sun I, 188 F.3d at 1121). 
 90.  See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2010) (determining that because 
Vernor was a licensee and not an owner, his actions infringed upon Autodesk’s copyright). 
 91.  628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 92.  Id. at 1178–79. 
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dispositive of the issue.”93  The court determined that these distributions 
were “sales,” not “licenses,” because they had been unsolicited, because 
there was no evidence that the recipients had agreed to a license, and 
because the distributor had made no effort to track the use or disposition of 
the CDs after they had been distributed.94 
Additionally, the Copyright Office has stated that the first sale 
doctrine does not extend to cover digital transmission.95  With the world 
quickly shifting towards digital access to copyrighted works, however, the 
underlying policies of the first sale doctrine still apply.  It seems fairly 
obvious that a major reason companies such as Apple and Amazon are 
offering digital goods pursuant to licenses is to control the after-market for 
resales.  In this respect, whether the good is tangible or intangible, these 
practices are hard to distinguish from the facts at issue in Bobbs-Merrill, as 
they all attempt to prevent individuals from profiting from downstream 
sales. 
V. THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE AND DIGITAL GOODS IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 
The ECJ was recently faced with the question of whether the first sale 
doctrine applies to software in UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International 
Corp., and, in stark contrast to United States courts, determined that 
content licenses may not prohibit the further transfer or resale of software 
under Article 4(2) of Directive 2009/24.96  UsedSoft enables companies to 
resell software licenses that they have purchased but do not use or need.97  
Oracle develops computer software and distributes it to consumers by 
allowing users to download it from the Internet.98  When UsedSoft sold 
customers used licenses, the purchasers were able to download a copy of 
Oracle’s software to their computers.99  Subsequently, Oracle brought suit 
against UsedSoft.100 
The ECJ was faced with the task of interpreting the Computer 
Programs Directive to determine if UsedSoft had violated Oracle’s 
reproduction right.  Unlike the district court in ReDigi, however, the ECJ 
was able to avoid the reproduction issue by equating the sale of the used 
 
 93.  Id. at 1180 (citing Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1109). 
 94.  Id. at 1180. 
 95.  U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 39. 
 96.  Case C-128/11 (July 3, 2012), available at http://curia.europa.eu/. 
 97.  Id. ¶¶ 24–25. 
 98.  Id. ¶ 21. 
 99.  Id. ¶ 26. 
 100.  Id. ¶ 27. 
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license to that of the original downloaded copy.101  Pursuant to article 5(1) 
of the Computer Programs Directive, a “lawful acquirer” of a computer 
program does not need authorization from the copyright holder to use the 
program in accordance with its intended purpose.102  Additionally, Article 
4(2) states, “The first sale in the Community of a copy of a program by the 
rightholder or with his consent shall exhaust the distribution right within 
the Community of that copy, with the exception of the right to control 
further rental of the program or a copy thereof.”103  The ECJ noted that “a 
commonly accepted definition [of] a ‘sale’ is an agreement by which a 
person, in return for payment, transfers to another person his rights of 
ownership in an item of tangible or intangible property belonging to 
him.”104  The court then determined that a buyer of used software is a 
“lawful acquirer” under article 5(1) because the buyer retains the original 
license to the software.105 
Therefore, the court interpreted the first sale doctrine broadly, 
applying it to “the grant of a right to use a copy of a computer program, for 
an unlimited period, in return for payment of a fee designed to enable the 
copyright holder to obtain a remuneration corresponding to the economic 
value of the copy of the work” regardless of whether it was purchased 
pursuant to a license agreement.106  If the first sale doctrine were not 
interpreted broadly, “the effectiveness of [Article 4(2)] would be 
undermined, since suppliers would merely have to call the contract a 
‘licence’ rather than a ‘sale’ in order to circumvent the rule of exhaustion 
and divest it of all scope.”107  The UsedSoft decision made clear that 
exhaustion applies to used software in the European Union.108  It is less 
clear whether exhaustion applies to other digital goods, such as electronic 
books or music. 
Recently, the German Regional Court of Bielefeld determined that the 
UsedSoft decision does not apply to electronic or audio books.109  The court 
reasoned that the UsedSoft decision had relied upon the Computer 
Programs Directive and therefore applies solely to software—not to any 
 
 101.  Id. ¶¶ 61–63. 
 102.  Council Directive 2009/24, art. 5, ¶ 1, 2009 O.J. (L 111) 16, 18 (EC). 
 103.  Id. art. 4, ¶ 2. 
 104.  Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH, ¶ 42. 
 105.  Id. ¶ 89. 
 106.  Id. ¶ 49. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. ¶ 88. 
 109.  Linklater, supra note 15. 
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other digital goods.110  The court looked to the Information Society 
Directive, which provides for the exhaustion of copyright, and found that it 
did not contain language comparable to Article 5(1) of the Computer 
Programs Directive, which allows for the resale of used software.111  
Without similar language, the court concluded that the resale of used 
electronic books is prohibited.112  The parties have indicated their intent to 
appeal, but as it stands now, this decision upholds the status quo regarding 
the resale of electronic books in Europe.113 
Currently, the United States and the European Union have different 
stances on the first sale doctrine as applied to software.114  Article 4(2) of 
the Computer Programs Directive explicitly states that a sale of software 
within the EU only exhausts all rights within the EU;115 therefore, United 
States law will govern software that was produced in the EU but licensed to 
a consumer in the United States.  But under the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., software that United 
States corporations license to consumers in the EU can be resold or 
transferred to a third party in the EU, who, in turn, can then resell it in the 
United States.116  Although Vernor explicitly prohibits applying the first 
sale doctrine to licensees,117 courts will be faced with determining whether 
the United States consumer who purchased the license from the EU is a 
licensee or an owner. 
VI. CREATING A DIGITAL FIRST SALE DOCTRINE 
Given the current state of the law and the pervasive licensing of digital 
goods, secondary markets for those goods will be unavailable for the 
foreseeable future.  Although the demand for secondary markets for digital 
music may be waning, there may be serious implications for consumers’ 
ability to participate in a secondary market for electronic books.  For 
consumers to have access to secondary markets in both the United States 
and the EU, the judicial or legislative systems in those two governments 
must alter the state of the current law. 
 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Compare Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), with 
Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., (July 3, 2012), available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/. 
 115.  Council Directive 2009/24, supra note 102. 
 116.  See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013) (holding that the first sale 
doctrine applies to copies of copyrighted works lawfully made in foreign countries). 
 117.  Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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A. Judicial Response in the United States 
To access digital secondary markets in the United States, users must 
get around the copyright owner’s reproduction right and, perhaps more 
importantly, the restrictive licensing schemes attached to all digital goods.  
Federal courts have exceptional latitude within the arena of copyright law.  
Absent congressional intervention, judicial decisions have advanced and 
defined copyright law, for better or worse.  Therefore, the judicial system 
has the ability to expand consumer protection by limiting restrictive 
licensing agreements and by expanding the first sale doctrine to digital 
goods.  Consumers may attempt to challenge licenses through the copyright 
misuse defense or by claiming that they are adhesion contracts.  
Additionally, courts in the United States and in the EU may determine, as 
the ECJ did in the case of software, that the restrictive licensing schemes 
attached to digital goods are simply a device used by corporations to escape 
the first sale doctrine in contravention of the basic purpose of copyright. 
Copyright misuse “is a judicially crafted affirmative defense to 
copyright infringement, derived from the long-standing existence of such a 
defense in patent litigation.”118  The Supreme Court has not yet weighed in 
on the viability of the defense, which has caused confusion in the circuits: 
“several circuits allow a misuse defense to stand where a defendant can 
demonstrate a violation of ‘public policy,’ whereas other courts require 
copyright misuse defendants to make a showing that the plaintiff violated 
the antitrust laws by attempting to extend its copyright.”119  Courts that 
adhere to the public policy-based defense look “specifically at copyright 
licensing provisions and decide[] whether the scope of the private rights 
granted by the copyright is being improperly expanded.”120  Under this 
reading, circuit courts have affirmed findings of copyright misuse where 
“the licensor restricted the licensee’s ability to develop similar software, 
effectively expanding the scope of the copyright beyond the protected 
expression to the unprotected idea”; where “license provisions restrict[ed] 
the licensee’s ability to use competing products”; and where a “license 
provision[] . . . restricted a licensee’s ability to develop products to 
compete with the licensor’s uncopyrighted products.”121  Courts that adhere 
to the antitrust-based defense focus “on assessing the challenged conduct’s 
 
 118.  Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 119.  Scott A. Sher, In Re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation: Defining the Contours of the 
Copyright Misuse Doctrine, 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 325, 328 (2002). 
 120.  Brett Frischmann & Daniel Moyland, The Evolving Doctrine of Copyright Misuse, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
269, 292 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007). 
 121.  Id. 
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actual and potential effect on competition.”122  Courts will first “evaluate 
the scope of the rights and the breadth of protection granted to copyright 
holders; and, second, . . . evaluate the net competitive effects of any 
questionable conduct.”123 
Under either approach, it seems at least plausible that the Court could 
find that the licensing schemes used in connection with digital goods 
amount to copyright misuse.  Unfortunately, the copyright misuse defense 
has not been successfully used to challenge the validity of licensing 
schemes that prevent resale in secondary markets in the United States.124  In 
the EU, while the ECJ did not specifically state in UsedSoft that the 
software license amounted to copyright misuse, it found that allowing 
licenses that restricted resale would completely undermine the rule of 
exhaustion.125 
Consumers may also challenge these licenses as unconscionable 
adhesion contracts.  State law governs the contours of adhesion contracts; 
for example, California has defined such a contract as “a standardized 
contract, drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, that relegates 
to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or 
reject it.”126  Even though a contract is adhesive, it “must still be interpreted 
in the light of the reasonable expectations of the adhering parties”127 and 
will not be struck down by the court “[a]bsent clear evidence of other 
factors, such as undue oppression or unconscionability.”128 
One example of unconscionable adhesion contracts are “shrinkwrap” 
licenses, which “refer[] to the fact that the license begins when the 
purchaser reads its terms and tears open the transparent plastic wrapping, or 
‘shrinkwrap,’ that encloses the software product.”129  The debate 
 
 122.  Id. at 291. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  See UMG Recordings, Inc., v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(citing Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 145–46 (2d Cir. 1998); 
Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[A] copyrighterholder’s [sic] 
‘exclusive’ rights, derived from the Constitution and the Copyright Act, include the right, within broad 
limits, to curb the development of such a derivative market by refusing to license a copyrighted work or 
by doing so only on terms the copyright owner finds acceptable”). 
 125.  Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., ¶ 49 (July 3, 2012), available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/. 
 126.  Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Armendariz v. Found. Health 
Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000)).  While the definition may differ slightly from state 
to state, this is a generally accepted definition for an adhesion contract. 
 127.  Realnetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass’n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913, 947 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 
(citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Keenan, 216 Cal. Rptr. 318, 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
 128.  Id. at 947–48 (citing Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 172 (Cal. 1990). 
 129.  SoftMan Products Co. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1085 n.12 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
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surrounding the enforceability of licenses began with the use of these 
licenses by software companies.130  A number of courts found shrinkwrap 
licenses invalid, “characterizing them as contracts of adhesion, 
unconscionable, and/or unacceptable pursuant to the Uniform Commercial 
Code.”131  These decisions, however, rested on the fact that the user had not 
had the opportunity to assent;132 licensees of digital goods assent to a 
license agreement before they are able to download the item. 
The licensing agreements to which users are subjected prior to 
obtaining digital goods are fairly obviously adhesion contracts: they are 
imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, and the 
user only has the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.133  It 
seems unreasonable, however, that a corporation would separately 
negotiate every single license with potential licensees.  Therefore, it seems 
unlikely that a court would find that the licensing schemes used in digital 
goods are unenforceable adhesion contracts. 
The Supreme Court could also choose to opine on this issue.  It would 
need to hold that the copyright owner’s reproduction right was not violated 
and invalidate any licensing agreement attached to the purchase of the 
good.  The Court could easily hold that the reproduction right was not 
violated through the reasoning in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc.134  There, Sony had developed the Betamax videotape 
recording device, which allowed consumers to make copies of television 
shows for the purpose of “time shifting.”135  Universal City Studios argued 
that the technology violated their exclusive rights granted in the Copyright 
Act.136  The Court held that Sony was not liable and thus reaffirmed its 
position that where “technological change has rendered its literal terms 
ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of [its] basic 
purpose”:137 to incentivize creative works for the “ultimate[] . . . cause of 
 
 130.  See SoftMan Products Co., 171 F. Supp. 2d; see also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 
1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 131.  SoftMan Products Co., 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1088 (citing Step–Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse 
Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988)). 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  See Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003) (“In finding the CSA [agreement] 
procedurally unconscionable, the district court emphasized that, after drafting the agreement, AT&T 
imposed the CSA on its customers without opportunity for negotiation, modification, or waiver.  We 
agree.  AT&T mailed the CSA in an envelope that few customers realized contained a contract, and 
offered its terms on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.”). 
 134.  464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 135.  Id. at 443 (citing Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 468 
(C.D. Cal. 1979), rev’d 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d 464 U.S. 417 (1984)). 
 136.  Id. at 420. 
 137.  Id. at 432 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)). 
COBB MACRO(DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2014  8:58 PM 
2014] LICENSING AGREEMENTS AND THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE 549 
promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other 
arts.”138  Since digital technology has “rendered its literal terms 
ambiguous,” the Court could find that ReDigi’s technology serves the 
Copyright Act’s basic purpose by making “used” digital music available to 
consumers more cheaply than “new” music from iTunes or Amazon, for 
example. 
The Court would then need to determine the effect of licensing 
agreements on the first sale doctrine.  The Court should take a functional 
rather than a textual approach in construing the limits of a license.  Before 
the dawn of the digital age, some courts noted that the first sale doctrine 
applied when the copyright proprietor was fairly compensated and had thus 
“received his reward” for the use of the copyrighted material.139  
Additionally, in Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that “courts should inquire into 
whether the party exercises sufficient incidents of ownership over a copy of 
the program to be sensibly considered the owner of the copy.”140  The 
Court may also look to the international community’s response to the 
application of exhaustion to digital goods: most notably, the UsedSoft 
decision.141 
While there are many policy justifications for permitting licensing 
schemes, such as enabling price discrimination and decreasing piracy, 
copyright owners are not granted a right to make their goods available 
through tiered pricing models in the Copyright Act.  In applying a 
functional approach, the Court might determine that the licensing 
agreements used by the music and electronic book industry are actually 
“sales” for the purpose of the first sale doctrine.  Specifically, it might grant 
users the right to use the music or electronic book however they please, as 
they have paid a fee that fairly remunerates the copyright owner.  By 
labeling the purchase of a digital good pursuant to a license a “sale,” the 
Court would make secondary markets available for digital goods. 
B. Judicial Response in the European Union 
The ECJ has addressed the validity of exhaustion as applied to 
software, but it is unclear whether exhaustion applies to all digital goods.  
The UsedSoft decision relied on language in the Computer Programs 
 
 138.  Id. at 431–32 (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)). 
 139.  See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 140.  402 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 141.  See supra notes 96–108 and accompanying text. 
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Directive to determine that exhaustion applies to software.142  The 
Information Society Directive provides for the exhaustion of all other 
copyrighted works.143  Given the recent German decision,144 the ECJ may 
have the opportunity to clarify the application of the doctrine to all digital 
goods. 
The Information Society Directive was enacted by the European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union to harmonize the 
copyright laws of the Member States, which would provide “increased 
legal certainty . . . [and] a high level of protection of intellectual 
property . . . [and] foster substantial investment in creativity and 
innovation.”145  The Directive states that an act of communication does not 
give rise to exhaustion; “first sale or other transfer of ownership” does, 
however.146  The ECJ mentioned the Information Society Directive in 
UsedSoft, stating: 
 
[T]he existence of a transfer of ownership changes an ‘act of 
communication to the public’ provided for in Article 3 of [the 
Information Society Directive] into an act of distribution referred to in 
Article 4 of the [Information Society Directive] which, if the conditions 
in Article 4(2) of the [Information Society Directive] are satisfied, can, 
like a ‘first sale . . . of a copy of a program’ referred to in Article 4(2) of 
[the Computer Programs] Directive . . . , give rise to exhaustion of the 
distribution right.147 
 
Since the ECJ determined that a consumer downloading a product 
from the Internet, paying the corresponding fee, and acquiring the right to 
use it for an unlimited period is an “act of distribution,” giving rise to 
exhaustion, it might also determine that downloading digital music and 
electronic books is an act of distribution, which would give rise to 
exhaustion under the Information Society Directive. 
The ECJ does face obstacles to finding that exhaustion applies to all 
digital goods, however.  First, the Information Society Directive states that 
“[t]he question of exhaustion does not arise in the case of services and on-
line services in particular.”148  Additionally, unlike physical CD-ROMs or 
 
 142.  See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 143.  Council Directive 2001/29, supra note 2, arts. 10, 12. 
 144.  See supra notes 109–13 and accompanying text. 
 145.  Council Directive 2001/29, supra note 2, recital 4. 
 146.  Id. art. 4, ¶ 2. 
 147.  Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., ¶ 52 (July 3, 2012), available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/. 
 148.  Council Directive 2001/29, supra note 2, recital 29. 
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CD-Is, which are tangible media on which intellectual property is located, 
“every on-line service is in fact an act which should be subject to 
authorisation where the copyright or related right so provides.”149  As 
technology advanced, the EU distinguished intangible items such as 
downloaded digital goods from tangible items such as CD-ROMs, and it 
appears that the EU, similar to the United States, is having difficulty 
applying the rule of exhaustion to intangible items.  Given the ECJ’s 
concerns about the abuse of licenses to circumvent exhaustion,150 the court 
may be open to an argument that downloading digital goods, as opposed to 
streaming digital music, is not an “on-line service” and that therefore 
exhaustion can arise. 
Finally, the ECJ will have to determine whether the temporary 
reproduction of a digital file that is currently necessary to make the file 
available for resale is a lawful use.  Article 2 of the Information Society 
Directive “prohibit[s] direct or indirect, temporary or permanent 
reproduction by any means and in any form, in whole or in part.”151  Article 
5(1) does allow for temporary reproductions “which are transient or 
incidental [and] an integral and essential part of a technological process and 
whose sole purpose is to enable: (a) a transmission in a network between 
third parties by an intermediary, or (b) a lawful use.”152  As noted above, 
the United States has determined that temporary reproductions are not 
lawful.153  Given the ECJ’s broad interpretation of the rule of exhaustion 
based on policy concerns about the ability of suppliers to abuse licenses to 
circumvent the rule,154 it may be amenable to expanding the scope of 
exhaustion to include all digital goods. 
C. Legislative Response in the United States 
Perhaps the most realistic opportunity for the creation and viability of 
secondary markets for digital goods is through new legislation.  In 2013, 
 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 151.  Id. art. 2. 
 152.  Id. art. 5, ¶ 1. 
 153.  Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1107, 1109 (9th Cir 2010) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 
117(a)(1) (2012)) (“The exclusive distribution right is limited by the first sale doctrine, an affirmative 
defense to copyright infringement that allows owners of copies of copyrighted works to resell those 
copies.  The exclusive reproduction right is limited within the software context by the essential step 
defense, another affirmative defense to copyright infringement . . . . [whereby] a software user who is 
the ‘owner of a copy’ of a copyrighted software program does not infringe by making a copy of the 
computer program, if the new copy is ‘created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer 
program in conjunction with a machine and . . . is used in no other manner.’”). 
 154.  See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
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realizing the need to update the 1976 Copyright Act, Maria Pallante, the 
current Registrar of the United States Copyright Office, called for Congress 
to change the copyright statute, given “the age of the Internet, where 
technology can so quickly affect the creation and communication of 
creative materials.”155  Pallante reiterated that although the underlying 
policy for the first sale doctrine is “rooted in the common law rule against 
restraints on the alienation of tangible property,” Congress could choose to 
review the rule’s application to digital goods.156  According to Pallante, 
Congress has two choices in such a review: 
 
On the one hand, Congress may believe that in a digital marketplace, the 
copyright owner should control all copies of his work, particularly 
because digital copies are perfect copies (not dog-eared copies of lesser 
value) or because in online commerce the migration from the sale of 
copies to the proffering of licenses has negated the issue.  On the other 
hand, Congress may find that the general principle of first sale has 
ongoing merit in the digital age and can be adequately policed through 
technology—for example, through measures that would prevent or 
destroy duplicative copies.  Or, more simply, Congress may not want a 
copyright law where everything is licensed and nothing is owned.157 
 
Additionally, the United States Patent and Trademark Office, in 
collaboration with the Copyright Office, is attempting to find “a way to 
preserve the [first sale] doctrine’s benefits, allowing the equivalent of 
sharing favorite books with friends, or enabling the availability of less-
than-full-price versions to impecunious students” in the digital era, through 
possible amendments to the Copyright Act.158  It acknowledged that 
licensing is quickly becoming the common means of distribution for music 
and electronic books, which will “render the first sale doctrine 
meaningless” as applied to digital goods.159  In recognizing the implications 
of licensing on secondary markets, the Patent & Trademark Office stated 
that “courts or policy makers [may want] to reinterpret what constitutes a 
‘license’ or to expand the scope of the first sale doctrine.”160 
The United States Congress has unsuccessfully attempted to pass 
 
 155.  Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315, 320 (2013). 
 156.  Id. at 331. 
 157.  Id. at 332. 
 158.  DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND 
INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 37 (2013), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/ 
publications/copyrightgreenpaper.pdf. 
 159.  Id. at 36. 
 160.  Id. 
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legislation establishing a digital first sale doctrine.  The Benefit Authors 
Without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer Expectations 
(BALANCE) Act of 2003 sought to amend section 109 of the Copyright 
Act by allowing first sale to apply “if the owner does not retain the copy or 
phonorecord in a retrievable form and the work is so sold or otherwise 
disposed of in its original format.”161  Additionally, if digital works were 
obtained subject to nonnegotiable license terms, the terms of such license 
would be unenforceable.162  This legislation failed to become law due to the 
loopholes that it left open regarding the reproduction right, its failure to 
specify how the digital good would be deleted from the original owner’s 
devices, and the severe limitations that it placed on the use of restrictive 
licensing agreements.163 
Given that “used” digital goods are indistinguishable from “new” 
digital goods, Congress may have to alter the traditional first sale doctrine 
to protect the original market for these goods.  One suggestion has been to 
institute a resale royalty scheme.164  By allowing copyright holders to 
collect resale royalties for their digital goods sold in the secondary markets, 
Congress would protect them from “the unique risks that nondegrading 
digital formats, connected to a vast and limitless distribution system, pose 
for copyright owners.”165 
D. Legislative Response in the European Union 
The legislative response in the European Union has similarly failed to 
sufficiently address the growing inadequacies of current copyright law in 
the digital era.  In December of 2012, in response to the Hargreaves 
Review of Intellectual Property and Growth, the United Kingdom’s 
Intellectual Property Office released a report that set out a number of 
recommendations for the UK to “adapt its strong but rigid framework for 
copyright into one that is modern, robust and flexible.”166  The Office 
recognized that “[t]he digital era and digital technologies provide new 
opportunities across the creative sectors and beyond, but pose new 
 
 161.  H.R. 1066, 108th Cong. § 4 (2003). 
 162.  Id. § 123(b). 
 163.  Bill Summary & Status, 108th Congress (2003 - 2004), H.R. 1066, LIBR. CONGRESS: 
THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:H.R.1066: (last visited Mar. 26, 2014); Grant 
Gross, Bill Would ‘Protect’ Consumers from DMCA: Effort Seen as Uphill Fight in Congress, 
INFOWORLD (Mar. 5, 2003), http://www.infoworld.com/t/applications/bill-would-protect-consumers-
dmca-950?page=0,0. 
 164.  See Serra, supra note 18, at 1798. 
 165.  Id. at 1799. 
 166.  HM GOVERNMENT, MODERNISING COPYRIGHT: A MODERN, ROBUST AND FLEXIBLE 
FRAMEWORK 2 (2012), available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/response-2011-copyright-final.pdf. 
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questions of a copyright regime that is based on an analogue world.”167  
Unfortunately, the proposed amendments do not squarely address digital 
exhaustion.  Specifically, the Office has proposed a private copying 
exception, which would allow an individual to make a copy of a 
copyrighted work and to permanently transfer that copy to another person 
so long as the original copy is destroyed.168  Additionally, if any term of a 
contract were to restrict or prevent an individual from copying or 
transferring the copy to another person, that term would be deemed 
unenforceable.169 
Although this amendment is not explicitly limited to transfers of 
physical copies, it would be difficult to argue that it sanctions the copying 
of digital goods, as it fails to address the reproduction right that is currently 
implicated in a digital transfer.  Additionally, this proposal does not address 
forward-and-delete technology, essentially leaving to the user the 
responsibility of deleting the original file after it has been copied and 
transferred to another user.  Lastly, the private copying that is sanctioned 
by the proposed amendment only applies to copies made for the 
individual’s private use, not to copies made for commercial purposes (i.e., 
sales).170  On the bright side, the language of the amendment does limit the 
use of restrictive licenses, which is necessary for the existence of digital 
secondary markets. 
* * * 
While the recognition of a digital first sale doctrine in both the United 
States and the European Union would make secondary digital markets 
available, if secondary markets are to become a reality, any legislation will 
ultimately have to address licensing schemes, the reproduction right, and 
forward-and-delete technology.  Specifically, legislation will need to place 
limits on the acceptable terms of licensing agreements: that they cannot 
prohibit the transfer or resale of digital goods.  Legislation must also 
address the reproduction right that is implicated during the transfer from 
one user to another—perhaps by creating an exception to the reproduction 
right when a digital file is copied for the sole purpose of completing a sale 
or purchase in the secondary market.  Lastly, legislation must address the 
mechanisms for ensuring that the seller does not retain a copy of the digital 
good after it is transferred to the buyer.  The private sector may create 
technology that circumvents the reproduction right when selling used 
 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, PRIVATE COPYING annex a, available at http://www.ipo.gov. 
uk/types/hargreaves/hargreaves-copyright/hargreaves-copyright-techreview.htm. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. 
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digital goods and sufficient forward-and-delete technology.  Legislation 
would still be required, however, to limit the use of restrictive licensing 
schemes in connection with obtaining digital goods.  Ultimately, legislators 
must accept the fact that the current copyright regimes do not sufficiently 
protect consumers in the digital era. 
CONCLUSION 
To “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”171 in the United 
States and to “ensur[e] the maintenance and development of creativity in 
the interests of authors, performers, producers, consumers, culture, industry 
and the public at large”172 in the European Union, consumers should be 
able to purchase and sell digital goods in the secondary market.  While 
consumers in the United States do not have access to any secondary 
markets for digital goods, the European Union has recognized the valuable 
space that secondary markets occupy in today’s digital age, at least with 
regards to software, but have not yet applied the rule of exhaustion to all 
digital goods.173 
In the United States, the Southern District of New York is the most 
recent court to foreclose secondary markets with its ruling in ReDigi.174  
Although the ECJ determined that exhaustion applied to software in 
UsedSoft, the recent decision by the German Regional Court stated that the 
reasoning in UsedSoft does not apply to other digital goods and therefore 
held that exhaustion does not apply to electronic books.175  Despite this 
decision, ReDigi is now preparing to launch in Europe, likely due to the 
application of exhaustion to software and perhaps to their optimistic 
outlook on the European Union applying exhaustion to all digital goods.176 
This paper’s suggested changes can be made through either the 
judicial or legislative systems.  Although the courts in both the United 
States and the European Union have been averse to applying the first sale 
doctrine and exhaustion to digital goods, the ECJ has recognized the danger 
of allowing restrictive licensing agreements in connection with obtaining 
software: by attaching a license to a transaction, the first sale doctrine and 
the exhaustion doctrine are completely circumvented, giving manufacturers 
and distributors the power to control all downstream sales.  This reasoning 
 
 171.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 172.  Council Directive 2001/29, supra note 2. 
 173.  See supra Part V. 
 174.  See supra Part I. 
 175.  See supra Part V. 
 176.  ReDigi is Crossing the Pond!  Sign up to Stay in the Loop!, REDIGI, http://newsroom.redigi. 
com/europe/ (last visited May 4, 2014) (“ReDigi is preparing to open its doors in Europe.”). 
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should be expanded to apply to all digital goods, both in the European 
Union and the United States, which in turn would limit the enforceability of 
restrictive licensing agreements and allow digital goods to be sold and 
purchased in secondary markets. 
While the judicial systems in the United States and the European 
Union have the ability to transform copyright law, the most efficient way to 
make the necessary changes would be through new copyright legislation.  
Unfortunately, legislators in both the United States and the European Union 
have failed to adequately address the barriers that currently prevent the 
availability of secondary markets for digital goods.  If secondary markets 
are going to be a viable marketplace for consumers to purchase and sell 
used digital goods, it is imperative that the United States and the European 
Union make changes to their arcane copyright laws.  Simply creating a 
digital first sale doctrine, however, does not entirely solve the problem; 
they must allow for intermediate copying so that the actual purchase or sale 
of digital goods does not infringe a copyright owner’s reproduction right.  
Additionally, limits must be placed on the acceptable terms of restrictive 
licensing agreements in connection with digital goods.  These changes 
would not only modernize the current copyright regimes but also recognize 
the important role that consumers play in the dissemination and promotion 
of the arts and sciences in the digital era. 
